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ABSTRACT Cognitive radio network (CRN) is the next generation wireless network that allows unlicensed
users [secondary users (SUs)] to explore and use the underutilised licensed channels (white spaces) owned
by licensed users (primary users). The purpose is to increase the spectrum utilization for enhanced network
performance. Clustering segregates SUs in a CRN into logical groups (clusters) with each consisting of a
leader (cluster head) and member nodes. A budget-based cluster size adjustment scheme is applied to enable
each cluster to adjust its number of member nodes in its cluster based on the availability of white spaces in
order to improve network scalability. However, cluster size adjustment is prone to attacks by malicious SUs
that launch random and intelligent attacks. Hence, we incorporate an artificial intelligence approach called
reinforcement learning (RL) into a trust model to countermeasure the random and intelligent attacks. The
simulation results show that RL-based trust model increases the utilization of white spaces and cluster size to
improve network scalability and enhance network performance despite the presence of RL-based intelligent
attacks.
INDEX TERMS Artificial intelligence, reinforcement learning, attacks, trust model, cognitive radio.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) enables unlicensed users (or secondary
users, SUs) to explore and use underutilised licensed channels
(or white spaces) owned by licensed users (or primary users,
PUs) in order to increase the overall spectrum utilisation and
network performance [1]. A distributed CR network (CRN)
consists of a number of SUs who communicate among them-
selves in the absence of fixed network infrastructure, such as
an access point or a base station [2]. Clustering segregates
SUs in a CRN into logical groups (or clusters). Each cluster
consists of a leader (or cluster head) and member nodes as
shown in Figure 1. A SUmember node can be a single or mul-
tiple hops away from the SU cluster head [3]. This means that
a SU member node – being a child – can connect to a cluster
head – being a parent – directly, or via an upstream member
node. The cluster heads and some of their member nodes form
a backbone route leading to a base station. Larger cluster
size improves network scalability, and it offers two main
advantages. Firstly, the overhead reduces since: a) routing
messages are exchanged among nodes in a backbone route
only, and b) clustering messages for updating the network
changes (e.g., the demand for white spaces) are exchanged
at the cluster level only rather than the network level [4]. The
problem is that malicious nodes can launch random or intel-
ligent attacks against cluster size, impeding the goals of
clustering to achieve the two main advantages. Intelligent
attacks enable malicious nodes to adapt their attack strategies
in order to prevent themselves from being identified. Hence,
in this research, an artificial intelligence approach called
reinforcement learning (RL) is incorporated into a trust model
to countermeasure the random and intelligent attacks. The
intelligent trust models enable cluster heads to adapt to the
dynamicity of attack strategies in order to identify malicious
nodes. This is a challenging problem because, not only does
RL being incorporated in the trust model of a SU cluster head,
it is incorporated in the attack model of a malicious SU node.
The rest of this section presents overviews of clustering
and cluster size adjustment. Subsequently, the security issues
of cluster size adjustment are presented to provide further
description on the problem of achieving the right cluster size
in order to achieve the two main advantages of clustering
under the random and intelligent attacks launched by mali-
cious nodes. Next, RL is presented. Finally our contributions
are presented. The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
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TABLE 1. General, clustering and RL notations used in this paper .
Section II presents related work. Section III presents system
model. Section IV presents the RL-based attack model and
our proposed RL-based trust model. Section V presents per-
formance evaluation. Table 1 summarizes the general, cluster-
ing, and RL notations used in this paper. For simplicity, SU
cluster head and SU member node are referred to as cluster
head and member node henceforth.
A. CLUSTERING
The motivation behind clustering is to achieve three main
advantages. Firstly, it improves network scalability. The clus-
ter heads and gateway nodes, which can hear from more
than a single cluster and provide inter-cluster communica-
tion, form a backbone route leading to the base station. The
member nodes only exchange messages with their respective
cluster heads via intra-cluster communication. Since routing
messages can be exchanged among nodes in a backbone route
only, the amount of overhead reduces in clustered networks as
opposed to the need to propagate routing messages among all
nodes in nonclustered networks. Secondly, it increases clus-
ter stability. Clustering messages for updating the network
changes (e.g., the demand for white spaces, channel avail-
ability, and network topology) are only exchanged locally for
reconfiguration among a cluster head and its member nodes at
the cluster level in clustered networks as opposed to the need
to propagate updates among all nodes at the network level
in nonclustered networks. Thirdly, it facilitates cooperative
tasks as the cluster head and its member nodes use a common
channel for intra-cluster communication [5]. For instance,
in cooperative channel sensing, a cluster head and its member
nodes perform channel sensing in a collaborative manner to
provide more accurate channel sensing outcomes.
In [6], a clustering scheme forms and maintains clusters
based on a mobility model (i.e., zone-based group mobil-
ity model) to improve network scalability and cluster sta-
bility, as well as to reduce energy consumption in mobile
ad-hoc networks. Spectrum-aware clustering schemes take
channel availabilities (e.g., the number of available channels
with white spaces) into consideration. In [7], a clustering
scheme selects cluster heads based on node degree (or the
number of neighboring nodes) in the available channels to
improve network scalability in a CRN, which has a multi-
channel environment. In [8], a clustering scheme forms and
maintains clusters based on the number of available chan-
nels and the speed of the nodes, as well as the interference
level from PUs to improve network scalability, as well as to
reduce clustering messages, packet loss, and the number of
disconnected nodes, in CRNs. In [9], a clustering scheme:
a) determines potential nodes of a route between a source
node and a destination node, b) selects cluster heads based
on node degree, the number of available channels, remaining
energy, the distance to the destination, and the speed of the
potential nodes, among the potential nodes, and c) selects
member nodes and a common channel for each cluster based
on the number of available channels. The clustering scheme
has been shown to increase the number of available common
channels in a cluster, as well as reduce clustering messages
and energy consumption. In [10], a clustering scheme forms
clusters based on the number of available channels, remaining
energy, and the speed of the nodes, to reduce end-to-end delay
performance.
In addition, recent reviews of clustering schemes [5], [11]
present various cluster formation and maintenance mecha-
nisms to achieve network scalability and cluster stability,
as well as to facilitate cooperative tasks in CR-based net-
works. At the time this paper is being written, there is only
a little effort to investigate cluster size adjustment, which is
the focus of this paper.
B. CLUSTER SIZE ADJUSTMENT
Budget-based cluster size adjustment scheme has been pro-
posed in wireless networks [12], although there has only
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FIGURE 1. An example of an attack scenario in cluster size adjustment.
CHc represents a cluster head CHc, and MNc, m represents a member
node m of cluster Cc. A malicious SU MN1,4 joins more than a single
cluster.
been perfunctory effort to investigate this approach in CRNs.
The cluster head determines the budget value that represents
the amount of white spaces at the cluster head, which is
dynamic in nature. Subsequently, the cluster head distributes
the budget value, in the form of tokens, to neighboring SUs.
Each neighboring SU requests for the right number of tokens
based on its number of children from the cluster head so that
the SU neighbour node, together with its children, become
member nodes of the cluster. For instance, in Figure 1, a SU
located two hops away from the cluster head (i.e., MN1,5)
would request two tokens: one is required to send a packet
to an upstream parent node (i.e., MN1,3), while another one
is required to send the packet from the upstream parent node
to the cluster head (i.e., CH1). Hence, with respect to the
cluster head, a single-hop SU requests a single token, a two-
hop SU requests two tokens, and so on. In CRNs, cluster size
adjustment enables cluster heads to adjust their respective
cluster sizes (i.e., the number of member nodes in a cluster)
according to the availability of white spaces in an adaptive
manner. Cluster size adjustment increases the cluster size of
a cluster when the amount of white spaces increases, allow-
ing more SUs to join the cluster, hence improving network
scalability. In this research, cluster size adjustment is first
investigated in the presence of malicious attacks.
Ideally, each SU joins one of its neighboring clusters and
becomes its member node, or forms its own cluster and
becomes a cluster head when none of the neighboring clusters
has sufficient tokens (or white spaces) to cater for the SU. The
cluster head determines the budget value that represents the
amount of white spaces at the cluster head. The cluster head
then distributes the budget value, in the form of tokens, to the
neighboring SUs, depending on the number of hops between
a cluster head and a member node. Therefore, the dynamic
budget value causes the cluster head to add or drop nodes
accordingly. Due to the dynamic availability of white spaces,
the SUmember nodes constantly and cooperatively exchange
clustering messages (e.g., the demands for white spaces) with
their respective cluster heads in order to maintain an ideal
cluster size.
C. SECURITY ISSUES OF CLUSTER SIZE ADJUSTMENT
Unfortunately, malicious SU member nodes tend to launch
attacks in two ways to reduce the utilisation of white spaces
in order to reduce network scalability. Firstly, a malicious
SU member node joins more than a single cluster to increase
its availability of white spaces. This means that a malicious
SU member node, who has joined a single cluster, continues
to join another cluster so that it can request white spaces
(or tokens) from the two clusters, depriving legitimate SUs
from joining the cluster and accessing the white spaces.
Secondly, a malicious SU member node requests more white
spaces (or tokens) from its cluster head(s). The cluster heads
of the two clusters may not be aware that a malicious SU
member node has joined more than a single cluster due to
the lack of communication and cooperation with each other
for two reasons. Firstly, the clusters may operate in different
channels in a multi-channel environment. Secondly, the clus-
ter heads may be located out of each other’s transmission
range. This causes the cluster head to allocate more white
spaces than the right amount, which again deprives legitimate
SUs of accessing the white spaces. As a consequence, cluster
size becomes smaller, causing network scalability to reduce.
Moreover, the occurrence of a node joining or leaving a clus-
ter increases clustering overhead. The malicious SU member
nodes can launch two types of attack strategies: a) random
attacks in which attacks are launched in a random manner;
and b) intelligent attacks in which attacks are launched using
RL to maximize its detrimental effects while avoiding being
detected [13]. The goal of the legitimate SUs is to form the
right cluster size in which themember nodes of a cluster make
full use of the budget value, and hence increase the utilisa-
tion of white spaces leading to improved network scalability.
To the best of our knowledge, the investigation on the effects
of RL-based attacks to cluster size adjustment is first of its
kinds.
Figure 1 shows an example of an attack scenario in cluster
size adjustment. There are two clusters, namely C1 and C2.
The clusterC1 consists of a cluster headCH1 and SUmember
nodes MN1,1, MN1,2, MN1,3, MN1,4, MN1,5 and MN1,6. The
cluster C2 consists of a cluster head CH2 and SU member
nodes MN2,7, MN2,8, MN2,9 MN2,10, MN2,11 and MN2,12.
Consider: a) cluster C1 operates in channel j = 1 and
cluster C2 operates in channel j = 2, and b) cluster heads
CH1 and CH2 are located out of each other’s transmission
range. Suppose, SU MN1,4 joins both clusters C1 and C2,
and requests for tokens from cluster heads CH1 and CH2.
It requests τ1,4 = 1 token from cluster headCH1 and τ2,4 = 1
token from cluster head CH2, and enjoys more transmission
opportunities. The malicious nature of such node reduces
network scalability as legitimate nodes may not join the
cluster due to insufficient available tokens. Cluster headsCH1
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FIGURE 2. A RL agent m in its operating environment at decision epochs t and t+1. (a) Desition epoch t .
(b) Desition epoch t + 1.
and CH2 may not be aware of MN1,4 joining their clusters
simultaneously as they are operating in different channels.
Therefore, the goal of the malicious node MN1,4 is to join
more than a single cluster so that it is allocated with more
tokens, and hence more white spaces (or transmission oppor-
tunities). This deprives legitimate SUs of accessing the white
spaces.
By requesting more tokens than necessary, malicious SU
member nodes can manipulate the budget value, and hence
the cluster size. In this paper, the budget value represents
the amount of white spaces at a cluster head, and so attacks
can reduce the utilisation of white spaces. With different
representations for the budget value, the attack scenario can
change. Consider a cooperative channel sensing scheme in
CRNs. The cluster head performs decision fusion on channel
sensing outcomes received from member nodes to produce
final decisions on channel availability. The budget value can
be based on the accuracy of the final decisions, whereby a
larger cluster size increases the number of channel sensing
outcomes received from member nodes, contributing to a
better accuracy. Malicious nodes can launch attacks to reduce
cluster size, and hence the accuracy of the final decisions,
resulting in increased interference to PUs’ activities.
D. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
Reinforcement learning (RL), which is an unsupervised artifi-
cial intelligence approach [14], is embedded in agents or deci-
sion makers to observe, learn, and select the optimal action
under the current operating environment for performance
enhancement as time goes by. Without learning, an agent
must use a predefined set of rules that may not cater for
all kinds of operating environment encountered throughout
an agent’s operation, causing suboptimal network perfor-
mance. Learning is inevitable as the optimal action varies in a
dynamic operating environment. RL has been widely applied
in wireless networks, particularly CRNs, to provide network
performance enhancement [15], and its application to security
enhancement has become popular [13]. As an example, RL is
embedded in a SU cluster head to observe, learn, and iden-
tify malicious SU nodes that launch random and intelligent
attacks in order to improve network performance. The use
of RL is necessary because of the dynamicity of the attack
strategy adopted by the malicious SU nodes. Nevertheless,
the use of RL has increased security vulnerabilities due to
the need to observe and learn from the operating environment
which can be manipulated. As an example, RL is embedded
in a malicious SU node who intelligently adjusts its attack
strategy to maximize the detrimental effects while switching
between legitimate and malicious behaviors to avoid being
detected. In [2], it has been shown that, intelligent attacks
can cause an agent to fail to achieve convergence to optimal
action. Due to the popularity of the use of RL in networking
schemes, and the lack of focus on intelligent attacks using
RL, this paper focuses on both aspects and investigates them
in the context of cluster size adjustment, which has received
little focus in the literature. The RLmodel has three main rep-
resentations, namely state, action, and delayed reward. The
agent observes the state, and selects an action tomaximize the
delayed reward, which represents the performance metrics.
Q-learning is a popular RL approach [14] that estimates the
Q-values Qm,t (sm,t , am,t ) of a state-action pair updated using
the Q-learning function as follows:
Qm,t+1(sm,t , am,t )← (1− α)Qm,t (sm,t , am,t )
+α[rm,t+1(sm,t+1)+ γmax
a∈AQm,t (sm,t+1, a)] (1)
Based on Figure 2 and Algorithm 1, an agent m observes
state sm,t . The agent then selects either an exploration or an
exploitation action. Using ε-greedy approach, a random
action (or an exploration action) am,t is selected with a small
probability ε to learn the Q-value of the action in order to
discover the best-known action, while the best-known action,
am,t with the highest Q-value (or the exploitation action) is
selected with probability (1− ε). The agent m then observes
state sm,t+1. For each state-action pair, an agentm observes its
delayed reward rm,t+1(sm,t+1), which is a short-term reward
received at decision epoch t + 1 after taking an action am,t
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Algorithm 1 Q-Learning Algorithm at Agent m
1: Repeat
2: Observe state sm,t
3: Determine exploration or exploitation
i. If exploration, choose a random action am,t
ii. If exploitation, choose the best known action am,t
using Equation (2)
4: Observe state sm,t+1
5: Receive delayed reward rm,t+1(sm,t )
6: Update Q-value Qm,t+1(sm,t , am,t ) using Equation (1)
under state sm,t at decision epoch t . The learning rate α
determines the extent to which the newly acquired knowledge
overrides the previously learnedQ-valueQm,t (sm,t , am,t ). The
discounted reward γmax
a∈AQm,t (sm,t+1, a) represents the cumu-
lative rewards received by the agent m at decision epoch
t = 1, 2, . . .. An agent m learns the optimal policy
pi∗(sm,t ) that provides a series of optimal actions under dif-
ferent states in order to maximize the cumulative reward
V pi
∗
(sm,t ), or value function, as follows [14]:
pi∗(sm,t ) = argmax
a∈A
Qm,t (sm,t , a) (2)
V pi
∗
(sm,t ) = max
a∈A Qm,t (sm,t , a) (3)
E. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
The contribution of our research is to address the presence of
malicious nodes that launch random and intelligent attacks
against cluster size adjustment. We address this critical issue
by using a RL-based trust model, which is a framework
that assigns trust value to each SU member node based on
its actions in order to identify and withdraw malicious SU
member nodes that join more than a single cluster or request
more tokens than required from their cluster head(s). While
the RLmodel can be embedded in a cluster head to implement
the trust model, it can also be embedded in a malicious
node to launch intelligent attacks. A legitimate (malicious)
SU member node has a higher (lower) trust value. To the
best of our knowledge, the investigation to countermeasure
intelligent attacks against cluster size adjustment in CRNs is
first of its kind.
II. RELATED WORK
This section presents cluster size adjustment, attacks in
CRNs, and RL-based Trust Model.
A. CLUSTER SIZE ADJUSTMENT
While general reviews on clustering and cluster size adjust-
ment schemes have been investigated in wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs) [16]–[21], mobile ad hoc networks [22], there
has only been perfunctory effort to investigate cluster size
adjustment schemes in CRNs.
In [23] and [24], a biclique graph approach is proposed
to enable a node to construct two types of graphs, namely
bipartite and biclique. A bipartite graph shows the relation-
ship of different characteristics (e.g., the number of available
common channels in a cluster and the number of member
nodes in a cluster), while a biclique graph shows characteris-
tics (e.g., cluster size) adjusted based on a set of rules. As an
example, using the rule a + b, the biclique graph maximizes
the number of member nodes a, and the number of available
common channels b, in a cluster.
In [25], a membership reassignment approach is proposed
to adjust the cluster size based on two strategies so that the
clusters in the network have higher local uniformity (or lower
variation in the number of nodes in a cluster). Firstly, if the
cluster size of a cluster is less than a cluster size threshold,
a physically closest member node from a neighboring cluster
whose size is greater than the cluster size threshold switches
its membership to join the cluster in order to reduce the num-
ber of single-node and small clusters. Secondly, each cluster
invites physically closest neighbour nodes to join its cluster
until the cluster size threshold is reached in order to reduce
variation in the number of nodes among the clusters. In [26],
another membership reassignment approach is proposed to
enable a base station to receive information from the clusters,
and reassign the membership of nodes who can hear from
more than a single cluster (e.g., gateway nodes) in order to
adjust the cluster size of the clusters so that all clusters in a
network have approximately the same cluster size.
In [27], cluster size is restricted to a maximum number of
hops between a cluster head and each of its member node in
order to improve network scalability inWSNs, although there
is non-uniform resource availability (e.g, channel capacity)
among the nodes. In [4], SpectruM-Aware clusteR-based
rouTing (SMART) scheme is proposed to enable SUs to
adjust the number of nodes in a cluster and search for a route
on a clustered network. In [28], a cluster size adjustment
scheme based on the distance between the sensor nodes and
base stations is proposed to improve energy utilisation of
the sensor nodes. In [29], a cluster size adjustment scheme
based on RL is proposed to improve network scalability and
cluster stability in CRNs. A budget-based approach is used to
ensure that the number of nodes in a cluster is restricted to a
budget value [30], [31]. In [30], a budget-based approach is
proposed to reduce the number of isolated nodes so that such
nodes can join a cluster even if the token has run out in order
to further improve network scalability. In [31], two budget-
based approaches are proposed, namely Rapid and Persistent.
Consider a tree structure rooted at the cluster head. In Rapid,
tokens are propagated downstream in a one-way direction,
so surplus tokens cannot be reused resulting in smaller cluster
size. In Persistent, tokens are propagated downstream in a
two-way direction, so surplus tokens can be redistributed by
parent nodes resulting in larger cluster size.
This paper extends the budget-based cluster size adjust-
ment scheme with a trust model to address malicious attacks.
Our proposed trust model can adapt to the dynamicity of
attack strategies adopted by the malicious nodes. This is
a challenging issue because an attack strategy may change
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as time goes by, so malicious nodes can be difficult to be
identified.
B. ATTACKS IN CRNS
While various kinds of attacks, including PU emulation
attacks [32]–[34], spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF)
attacks [35]–[37], byzantine attacks [38], [39], uninten-
tional attacks [40], [41], random attacks [42], [43], bias
attacks [42], [43], and denial of service (or jamming) attacks
[32], [44], [45], [46] have been well investigated in CRNs,
there is lack of investigation on intelligent attacks against
cluster size adjustment schemes. In [47], intelligent malicious
nodes launch jamming attacks against the cluster head when-
ever traffic presents at the cluster head, causing the cluster
head, as well as its neighboring cluster heads, to become
malicious, deteriorating the intra-clusters and inter-clusters
communication. In [41], a malicious SU launches intelligent
attacks by relying on the legitimate SUs sensing outcomes,
and only launch attacks when all the honest SUs provide
the same sensing outcomes, hence the attacker provides the
opposite sensing outcome. In [48], an intelligent malicious
node launches sybil attacks that enables nodes to switch
between multiple identities, which enhances its impact of
attack without being detected and enhances its performance
using RL.
To the best of our knowledge, the investigation on ran-
dom attacks and intelligent attacks to cluster size adjustment,
as well as the investigation on RL-based trust model to
address such attacks, is first of its kinds. By applying RL,
both malicious, as well as legitimate SUs that turn malicious,
can be detected as time goes by.
C. RL-BASED TRUST MODEL
RL has been applied to trust models to identify malicious
nodes in CRNs. In [35], the malicious nodes send inaccurate
sensing outcomes to neighboring nodes or a fusion center
in order to manipulate final decision on channel availability
in SSDF attacks. In [48], the malicious nodes launch sybil
attacks by generatingmultiple false sensing reports to a fusion
center in spectrum leasing. In [41], trust and reputation man-
agement has been applied to detect malicious SUs, as well as
legitimate SUs that turn malicious, in CRNs.
To the best of our knowledge, the investigation on
RL-based trust model to countermeasure intelligent attacks
in cluster size adjustment is first of its kinds. This is a chal-
lenging issue because we are using reinforcement learning to
tackle intelligent attacks.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
This section presents the system model, covering the local
operating environment, cluster formation and node joining.
A. LOCAL OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
AND WHITE SPACES
The CRN is comprised of SU m ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . , |M |}.
Each PU j ∈ J = {1, 2, . . . , |J |} transmits in its own channel
j, and so there are |J | available channels. A decision epoch t
consists of time windows with {1, 2, ..., ϑ} timeslots. A PU
j′s activity follows a Poisson ON-OFF model. The ON state
represents that a PU j occupies a channel j in which the ON
period is TONj , and the OFF state represents otherwise in
which the OFF period is TOFFj . The ON-OFF periods are
exponentially distributed with the ON and OFF arrival rates
λONj and λ
OFF
j , respectively [49], [50]. At decision epoch
t , the probabilities of channel j being ON and OFF are as
follows [51]:
PONj,t =
λOFFj
λONj + λOFFj
− λ
OFF
j
λONj + λOFFj
e−(λ
ON
j +λOFFj )t (4)
POFFj,t =
λONj
λONj + λOFFj
+ λ
OFF
j
λONj + λOFFj
e−(λ
ON
j +λOFFj )t (5)
where higher probability POFFj,t indicates a higher amount of
white spaces in channel j at decision epoch t .
B. CLUSTER FORMATION
In a cluster formation procedure, each cluster Cc ∈ C =
{C1,C2, . . . ,C|C|} consists of a cluster head CHc and mem-
ber nodes MNc,m ∈ MNc. Upon initialization, each SU m is
nonclustered nodeStatem = NC . Each SU m senses for each
available channel j ∈ J for a time interval Tscan, and joins one
of the neighboring clusters Cc ∈ Cc,m ⊆ C , and becomes its
member node MNc,m. Each cluster Cc must possess at least
a single common channel Jc > 1 to facilitate intra-cluster
communication. Member node MNc,m sends clustering mes-
sage µm,c in its cluster Cc.
There are two main cases for a nonclustered SU m. Firstly,
a SU m does not receive any clustering messages µm,c, so it
forms its own cluster Cc and becomes a cluster head CHc.
Secondly, a SUm receives at least a single clustering message
from multiple neighboring clusters |Cc,m|> 1. If there are no
suitable cluster head CHc, then the SU m becomes a cluster
head itself. Upon becoming a cluster head, the cluster head
CHc calculates the budget value of its cluster βc,t based on
the dynamic amount of white spaces available at the cluster
head at decision epoch t . Specifically, the budget value is
βc,t = POFFj,t × ϑ . For instance, the probability of a chan-
nel j being OFF at decision epoch t is POFFj,t = 0.6, and
each time window has 15 time slots, so the budget value
is βc,t = POFFj,t × ϑ = 0.6 × 15 = 9, whereby the
maximum number of available tokens in the cluster Cc is
given by Nc,t = βc,t = 9. Subsequently, the cluster head
distributes the budget value to its neighboring nodes 0m in
the form of tokens τc,m∈0m . Specifically, the budget value of
a cluster βc,t changes from time to time with respect to the
PUs’ activities at each decision epoch t . The cluster headCHc
then distributesNc,t available tokens at each decision epoch t .
C. NODE JOINING AND LEAVING
The node joining procedure for a nonclustered SU node to
join a cluster after receiving a token from a SU cluster head
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Algorithm 2Cluster Formation andMaintenance at Nonclus-
tered SU m
/*Part I: Scan each channel for clustering message*/
1: while J do
2: scan channel j ∈ J for Tscan
3: if receive µm,c from Cc then
4: store µm,c
5: end if
6: end while
/*Part II: Send and process received clustering message
*/
7: while not receive TACCc,m do
8: send TREQm,c to Cc
9: if receive TACCc,m then
10: store τc,m
11: nodeStatem = MN
12: else receive TDECc,m
13: end if
14: end while
is shown in Algorithm 2. The node joining and leaving pro-
cedures for a SU cluster head is shown in Algorithm 3. The
node leaving procedure due to insufficient budget for a SU
member node is shown in Algorithm 4.
In Part I of Algorithm 2, a nonclustered SU m scans
each available channel j ∈ J for a time interval Tscan to
receive and store clustering message µm,c sent by SU neigh-
boring nodes 0m. In Part II of Algorithm 2, SU m sends
and receives clustering message µm,c (e.g., token request
message TREQm,c and token accept message TACCc,m).
The SU m sends a TREQm,c to a cluster head CHc in
cluster Cc. The SU m receives a token accept message
TACCc,m from cluster head CHc, stores the token τc,m, and
becomes its member node MNc,m. Note that, the nonclus-
tered SU m joins a cluster based on the decisions made
by cluster heads, and so they do not consider the crite-
ria for node joining. If a SU m fails to join any clusters
(e.g., none of the neighboring clusters has sufficient number
of available tokens), it becomes a cluster head itself with
nodestatem = CH .
In Part I of Algorithm 3, a SU cluster head CHc scans its
common channel j for a decision epoch t and updates: a) the
budget value βc,t of the cluster Cc, which is equivalent to
the amount of white spaces in the common channel j at each
decision epoch t , specifically βc,t = POFFj,t × ϑ , and b) the
number of tokens available Nc,t at the cluster Cc based on the
updated budget value βc,t at each decision epoch t , specifi-
cally Nc,t = βc,t − Nc,t−1, where Nc,t−1 is the number of
tokens available in the cluster before the update. Both βc,t and
Nc,t are updated from time to time to maintain an ideal cluster
size. In Part II of Algorithm 3, the criteria for node joining is
applied by the SU cluster head CHc to grant a token τc,m to a
nonclustered SU m. Upon receiving a token request message
TREQm,c from a nonclustered SUm, the SU cluster head CHc
Algorithm 3Cluster Formation andMaintenance at SUClus-
ter Head CHc
/*Part I: Scan common channel of cluster to update
budget*/
1: while T do
2: scan common channel j for decision epoch t
3: update βc,t = POFFj,t × ϑ
4: update Nc,t = βc,t − Nc,t−1
5: end while
/*Part II: Send and process tokens*/
6: receive TREQm,c from nonclustered SU m
7: if Nc,t > 1 and Jc > DJc then
8: Nc,t = Nc,t - τc,m
9: send TACCc,m with τc,m to SU m
10: else
11: send TDECc,m to SU m
12: end if
/*Part III: Withdraw member nodes when budget is
insufficient*/
13: if Nc,t < 0 then
14: send TDECc,m to MNc,m
15: end if
updates the number of tokens available Nc,t in its cluster Cc,
and sends a token τc,m via a token accept message TACCc,m to
the nonclustered SUm if: a) at least a single token is available
Nc,t > 1, and b) the number of common channels in a cluster
upon node joining is greater than its preset threshold Jc>DJc .
Otherwise, the SU cluster head CHc sends a token decline
message TDECc,m to the nonclustered SU m. In Part III of
Algorithm 3, a SU cluster head CHc sends a token decline
message TDECc,m to a SUmember nodeMNc,m if the number
of tokens available at the cluster head CHc at decision epoch
t is insufficient, specifically Nc,t < 0. This allows cluster
maintenancewhereby the cluster size changeswith the budget
value, which changes with the amount of white spaces in the
common channel, in order to maintain an ideal cluster size as
time goes by.
Algorithm 4 Node Leaving From Cluster Cc at SU Member
Node MNc,m
1: if receive TDECc,m then
2: nodeStatem = NC
3: end if
In Algorithm 4, a SUmember nodeMNc,m leaves its cluster
Cc and becomes a nonclustered node when it receives a
token decline message TDECc,m from its cluster head CHc.
This happens when the budget value becomes insufficient,
specifically the number of tokens available at the cluster
head CHc at decision epoch t is insufficient Nc,t < 0. Upon
becoming a nonclustered SU m, it undergoes Algorithm 2 to
join another cluster with sufficient number of available
tokens.
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TABLE 2. RL model embedded in a malicious SU m for intelligent attacks.
IV. ATTACK MODEL AND PROPOSED
RL-BASED TRUST MODEL
This section presents the attack model adopted by the mali-
cious SUs, and the proposed RL-based trust model.
A. ATTACK MODEL
There are two types of attacks, namely random and intelligent
attacks. In random attacks, malicious SUs launch attacks in
a random manner without learning about the legitimate SUs’
information in the hope of lowering the reward of legitimate
SUs. In the intelligent attacks, RL is applied to maximize
the effect of the attacks and minimize the chance of being
detected by cluster heads. A successful attack maximizes
the malicious SUs’ reward, however if the malicious SU is
detected, it can be expelled from the cluster by a cluster head.
So, a malicious SU must choose its attack strategy based on
the response from the cluster head. For example, a cluster
head reduces the tokens allocated to a malicious SU, giving a
reduced reward to the malicious SU. Hence, the malicious SU
must adapt its attack strategy so that it is not expelled from
the cluster head. Table 2 represents the RL model embedded
in a malicious SU for intelligent attacks.
A malicious SU observes the perception it receives from
the cluster head (or state), which refers to the number of
tokens given by the cluster head ηgiven as opposed to the
number of tokens requested to the cluster head ηreq, specifi-
cally ηgiven
ηreq
. The cluster head reduces the distribution of tokens
requested by a member node under two circumstances: a) if
it detects a malicious SU that launches intelligent attacks and
b) if there is insufficient white spaces because the amount
of white spaces fluctuates due to the PUs’ activities. The
malicious SU then takes an action which consists of a combi-
nation of the probability of an attack, 0 ≤ am1,t ≤ 1 and
the intensity of an attack, 0 ≤ am2,t ≤ 1. When a state
occurs at decision epoch t , an action is selected to match with
the state in which the reward can be optimized. The reward
represents a successful attack, or the amount of wasted white
spaces ηwaste = ηreq - ηneed , where the number of wasted
white spaces ηwaste is the difference between the number of
tokens requested from the cluster head ηreq and the number
of tokens needed ηneed by the malicious SUs. Therefore,
when a malicious SU successfully joins more than a single
cluster or request for more tokens than required, it wastes the
tokens that deprives legitimate SUs of joining the cluster and
requesting for tokens. A malicious SU that receives a good
perception from the cluster head (i.e., cluster head grants
the number of requested tokens) tend to launch attacks with
higher probability and greater intensity. The malicious SU
must continuously adjust its action to maximize the amount
of wasted white spaces (or tokens) thereby reducing network
scalability without being detected.
B. PROPOSED RL-BASED TRUST MODEL
We propose a RL-based trust model to countermeasure the
effects of random and intelligent attacks from the malicious
SUs. Table 3 represents the RL model embedded in a SU
cluster head CHc.
TABLE 3. RL model embedded in a cluster head CHc .
The cluster headCHc adopts a trust model to establish trust
amongst its member nodes. The cluster head CHc awards
tokens to legitimate SUs, which have comparatively high
trust values or (Q-values Qm,t+1(am,t )). Note that, a cluster
head CHc increases the trust value of a SU member node
if the node joins a single cluster and requests for the right
amount of tokens and this is reflected by the increment of the
Q-values of the legitimate SU member nodes. Once a SU m
becomes a member node, it sends packets to the cluster head
CHc. However, the cluster head may not pass tokens to the
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SU m if there is insufficient of white spaces. If a member
node successfully sends packets to the cluster head, then it
is rewarded by rm,t+1 = 1, otherwise it is rewarded by
rm,t+1 = 0. The cluster headCHc calculates the reward rm,t+1
based on the utilisation level of the tokens (or successful
packet transmissions). Next, the cluster headCHc updates the
Q-value for the state-action pair using Equation (1).
C. STATE REPRESENTATION IN THE RL-BASED
ATTACK AND TRUST MODELS
The cluster head adopts a stateless RL model for the trust
model, while the malicious SU node adopts a RL model
with state representation for the attack model. The choice
of a stateless model is because the operating environment of
the cluster head does not affect the decision in the awarding
of tokens. Without state representation, the action space is
comparatively small compared to state-action space in mod-
els with states (which is adopted by the attack model), and
so the cluster head has the capability to learn faster. Hence,
the cluster head is expected to converge and perform better.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the simulation setup and parame-
ters, performance metrics, as well as results and discussions.
A. SIMULATION SETUP AND PARAMETERS
Our simulation is implemented in Microsoft Visual C++
simulator. The PUs and SUs are randomly deployed in aCRN.
A SU node should only join a single cluster and request for
the right number of tokens based on its hop count from its
cluster head. Table 4 presents the simulation parameters and
values.
TABLE 4. Simulation parameters.
For simplicity, RL and R refer to reinforcement learning
and random approaches, while CH and SU refer to cluster
head and malicious SU member node henceforth. We inves-
tigate four cases: a) Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) where both
cluster head and malicious SU member node use the RL
approach, b) Case II (R-CH + RL-SU) where cluster head
uses the random approach and malicious SU member nodes
use the RL approach, c) Case III (RL-CH + R-SU) where
cluster head uses the RL approach and malicious SU member
nodes use the random approach, and d) Case IV (R-CH +
R-SU) where both cluster head and malicious SU member
node use the random approach. Investigations are conducted
under varying probability of attack and intensity of attack.
The probability of attack represents the likelihood of a SU
node that attacks, and the intensity of attack represents the
severity of an attack. For instance, an intensity of attack value
of 0.1 means that 10% of the tokens (or white spaces) are
wasted.
B. PERFORMANCE METRICS
The performance metrics are as follows:
• Utilisation of white spaces ratio is the ratio of the num-
ber of tokens needed by SU member nodes based on
their hop count from their respective cluster heads to the
number of tokens requested by the SU member nodes
from their respective cluster heads.
• Cluster size ratio is the ratio of the number of SU
member nodes in a cluster without attack to the number
of SU member nodes in a cluster under attack.
C. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present analysis and performance com-
parison. For analysis, we investigate the effects of varying
probability of attack and intensity of attack on Case I (RL-
CH + RL-SU). The motivation is to investigate the effects
of attacks by malicious nodes against cluster heads. Results
obtained in analysis are applied for performance comparison.
Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU), where both malicious nodes and
cluster heads have the same level of intelligence, is significant
because most investigations consider malicious nodes that
launch random attacks [42], [43]. Specifically, in Case I, not
only is RL applied to cluster heads, but also malicious SU
nodes. Our results show that, cluster heads can still perform
better because the cluster head uses a stateless model that
enables the cluster heads to learn faster. This serves as a
proper guide for designing security schemes based on arti-
ficial intelligence. For performance comparison, we compare
the performances achieved in the four cases, namely Case I
(RL-CH+ RL-SU), Case II (R-CH+ RL-SU), Case III (RL-
CH + R-SU), and Case IV (R-CH + R-SU). A cluster head
aims to increase the number of nodes in a cluster (or reduce
the number of clusters in a network) in order to improve
network scalability. Malicious SU nodes aim to reduce the
number of nodes in a cluster by joining more than a single
cluster or requesting more tokens than required in order to
reduce network scalability.
1) ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTS OF VARYING PROBABILITY
OF ATTACK IN CASE I (RL-CH + RL-SU)
The results obtained in this section is applied for comparison
in Section V-C3.
Figure 3 shows the utilisation of white spaces (or tokens)
ratio for different intensity of attack under varying probability
of attack. The utilisation of white spaces generally decreases
when the probability of attack increases. Besides, the utili-
sation of white spaces also decreases when the intensity of
attack increases. This is because, when the probability of
attack is high, a cluster head disqualifies and expels malicious
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FIGURE 3. Utilisation of white spaces increases when the probability of
attack decreases.
FIGURE 4. Cluster size ratio increases when the probability of attack
decreases.
SUs from its cluster. In the case when a malicious SU is
expelled from its cluster, it tends to adapt attack strategy so
that it is not expelled from its cluster again.
Figure 4 shows the cluster size ratio for different intensity
of attack under varying probability of attack. The cluster
size ratio generally decreases when the probability of attack
increases. Besides, the cluster size ratio also decreases when
the intensity of attack increases. This means that, when the
probability and intensity of attack are both low (i.e., 0.1) there
is a higher cluster size ratio, which is close to a value of 1.
This shows that the cluster size is not significantly affected
FIGURE 5. Utilisation of white spaces increases when the intensity of
attack decreases.
by low probability and intensity of attack (i.e., 0.1). As the
probability and intensity of attack increase, we observe a
smaller cluster size ratio because some member nodes are
expelled from their respective clusters for being not trust-
worthy. Figure 4 shows that some results are close with each
other, and crossovers happen in some cases. For example,
in Figure 4, there is a crossover of cluster size ratio for the
result achieved by: a) probability of attack 0.2 and intensity
of attack 0.5, and b) probability of attack 0.2 and inten-
sity of attack 0.6; the amount of crossover is 0.01 or 1%.
Generally speaking, the amount of each crossover is small
in all cases, and crossovers occur when the probability of
attack is small (i.e., less than 0.3) and large (i.e., more than
0.6), indicating that learning becomes unstable because all
the possible actions become indistinguishable providing very
good or very poor network performance. Similar observations
are found in the literature [2]. Similar observations are also
found in Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11.
2) ANALYSIS ON EFFECTS OF VARYING INTENSITY
OF ATTACK FOR RL-CH + RL-SU
The results obtained in this section is applied for comparison
in Section V-C3.
Figure 5 shows the utilisation of white spaces (or tokens)
ratio for different probability of attack under varying intensity
of attack. The utilisation of white spaces generally decreases
when the intensity of attack increases. Besides, the utilisation
of white spaces also decreases when the probability of attack
increases. Figure 6 shows the cluster size ratio for differ-
ent probability of attack under varying intensity of attack.
The cluster size ratio decreases when the intensity of attack
increases. Besides, the cluster size ratio also decreases when
the probability of attack increases. The explanation on the
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FIGURE 6. Cluster size ratio increases when the intensity of attack
decreases.
FIGURE 7. Utilisation of white spaces increases when the probability of
attack decreases. Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) achieves better performance,
contributing to increased network scalability.
results in Section V-C1 applies similarly in this section.
3) PERFORMANCE COMPARISON CASE I (RL-CH + RL-SU)
AND CASE II (R-CH + RL-SU)
This section presents the comparison of performance between
Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) and Case II (R-CH + RL-SU)
whereby malicious SUs adopt RL-based intelligent attacks.
Figure 7 shows that the utilisation of white spaces
(or tokens) ratio in Cases I and II for different intensity of
FIGURE 8. Utilisation of white spaces increases when the intensity of
attack decreases. Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) achieves better performance,
contributing to increased network scalability.
attack under varying probability of attack. Case I (RL-CH +
RL-SU) shows a significantly higher increase in the
utilisation of white spaces as compared to Case II (R-CH
+ RL-SU) for varying probability of attack. There are two
main reasons for this significant difference. Firstly, in Case I
(RL-CH + RL-SU), the cluster head applies RL which
helps the cluster head to make the right decision so that it
awards tokens to SUs with comparatively higher trust values
(or Q-values). Secondly, in Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU),
the malicious SUs apply RL which helps them to choose
their attack strategies based on the response from the cluster
head. Case II (R-CH + RL-SU) achieves lower utilisation
level of white spaces because the cluster head applies the
random approach, therefore, the cluster head awards tokens to
SUs randomly. Hence, the utilisation level of white spaces is
higher in Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) compared to the Case II
(R-CH + RL-SU).
Figure 8 shows the utilisation of white spaces (or tokens)
ratio under varying intensity of attack. Case I (RL-CH +
RL-SU) achieves higher utilisation level of white spaces in
a cluster as compared to Case II (R-CH + RL-SU) because
the Q-values of Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) increases with
higher utilisation at the cluster head, allowing more SU nodes
to join the cluster and utilize white spaces. Higher utilisation
of white spaces increases network scalability.
Figure 9 shows the cluster size ratio in Cases I and II
for different intensity of attack under varying probability of
attack. Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) achieves higher cluster
size ratio compared to Case II (R-CH + RL-SU) because
the cluster head applies RL which helps to make the right
decision when awarding tokens to SUs with comparatively
high trust value (or Q-values). With larger cluster size, there
are lower number of clusters in a network, contributing to
increased network scalability.
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FIGURE 9. Cluster size ratio increases when the probability of attack
decreases. Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) achieves better performance,
contributing to increased network scalability.
FIGURE 10. Cluster size ratio increases when the intensity of attack
decreases. Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) achieves better performance,
contributing to increased network scalability.
Figure 10 shows the cluster size ratio in Cases I and II
for different probability of attack under varying intensity
of attack. Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) achieves higher cluster
size ratio compared to Case II (R-CH+ RL-SU). The cluster
size ratio under varying intensity of attack shows that the
average number of nodes in a cluster for Case I (RL-CH +
RL-SU) is higher because theQ-values reflect the effect of the
attack against the cluster. This increases network scalability.
Hence, Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) shows better performance
than Case II (R-CH + RL-SU).
FIGURE 11. Case III (RL-CH + R-SU) achieves higher values than Case IV
(R-CH + R-SU).
4) PERFORMANCE COMPARISON CASE III (RL-CH + R-SU)
AND CASE IV (R-CH + R-SU)
This section presents the comparison of performance between
Case III (RL-CH + R-SU) and Case IV (R-CH + R-SU)
whereby malicious SUs adopt random attacks.
Figure 11 shows that the utilisation of white spaces is
unstable for different intensity of attack under varying proba-
bility of attack. Case III (RL-CH + R-SU) achieves a higher
utilisation level of white spaces compared to Case IV (R-CH
+ R-SU). Due to the random nature of the attack, the overall
performance fluctuates and this causes instability. Neverthe-
less, applying RL can detect the attackers easily in practice
and they can be expelled from the cluster.
VI. CONCLUSION
This research presents a budget-based cluster size adjustment
scheme that is applied to each cluster, in order to adjust its
number of member nodes in its cluster based on the availabil-
ity of white spaces to improve network scalability. An artifi-
cial intelligence approach called reinforcement learning (RL)
is embedded in both cluster heads and malicious SU nodes
to countermeasure the effects of attack from malicious SU
nodes to form an optimal cluster size in CRN and to improve
network scalability. RL is embedded in cluster heads to help
make right decisions in awarding tokens to malicious SU
nodes while RL is embedded in malicious SU nodes to launch
intelligent attacks by observing and learning the operating
environment. Case I (RL-CH+ RL-SU) reflects the scenario
in which RL is embedded in both cluster heads and malicious
SU nodes. Although the malicious SU nodes are using RL,
the cluster head is able to perform better because the cluster
head adopts a stateless model while the malicious SU nodes
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has a large state-action pair. Therefore, the cluster head is
able to learn faster compared to the malicious SU nodes. The
performance of Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) is compared with
Case II (R-CH + RL-SU) in which cluster head adopts a
random approach and malicious SU nodes adopt RL, Case III
(RL-CH + R-SU) in which cluster head adopts RL and
malicious SU nodes adopt a random approach, and Case IV
(R-CH+R-SU) in which both cluster head and malicious SU
nodes adopt random approach. Simulation results show that
Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) shows stability in performance
compared to the other scenarios. Hence, simulation results
show that Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU) increases utilisation
of white spaces and cluster size ratio compared to the other
scenarios. In our future work, we aim to investigate important
areas of Case I (RL-CH + RL-SU), such as implementing a
mechanism that chooses the best case based on varying the
RL parameters.
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